S
ince the debt crisis of 1982, Mexico has experienced a series of stabilization efforts, trade liberalization, privatization, and other market-oriented reforms, but economic performance has fluctuated markedly.' In the early 1990s, after a long recession, the reforms appeared to be leading toward a significant recovery. In 1995, however, the economy again turned sharply downward as a consequence of the peso crisis and the uncertainties stemming from the 1994 presidential transition. This study examines public opinion about economic reform within this changing macroeconomic and political context, drawing on data from national opinion surveys conducted in 1992, 1994, and 1995. The analysis focuses primarily on the extent to which opinions about reform are influenced by orientations toward the president and the ruling party, which for almost seven decades have been the core institutions of the Mexican political regime. How important were these orientations, as 'distinguished from judgments about the effect of the reforms on personal well-being or on overall ~erformance of the economv? To what {sxtent did political loyalties continue to shape opinion (,luring the severe crisis of 1995, a period in which viAt.tually all Mexican households experienced a sharp dec-line in their economic situation? 7;No other issues discussed in the survey research lite1,ature also receive attention. One is the extent to whic:h policy preferences are influenced by "sociotropic" judgments about their effect on collective wellRobci t R. Kaufman is Professor of Political Science, Rutgers University. New Brunswick, NJ 08903, and Leo Zuckermann is a doctor;~l candidate, Department of Political Science, Columbia University. New York, NY 10027.
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For , liscussions of the economics of this period. see Lustig (1992) and B,\zdresch (1993). being. This question has been discussed extensively in studies of public opinion in the United States (Kiewiet 1983 ; l e w i e t and Rivers 1984; l n d e r 1981; Kiewiet 1979,1981; Kinder and Mebane 1983; Lau and Sears 1981; Rosentone, Hansen, and Kjnder 1986) . It is also relevant to countries in which market-oriented adjustments improve economic performance but have limited or negative effects on the distribution of income. The second issue highly relevant to the politics of reform is the extent to which the public may be willing to accept short-term sacrifices in the expectation of future benefits. The acceptance of such tradeoffs has been recently explored in works on Peru (Stokes 1996) , Poland (Przeworski 1996) , and Mexico (Buendia 1996) .
Our main concern, however, is how such judgments are mediated by orientations toward the president and the ruling party. The weight of political mediations in the formation of policy preferences is a function of both the salience of the issue to the individual and the costs of acquiring information about it. Stabilization and structural adjustment initiatives are highly salient to most Mexicans, and we expect that they will be inclined to evaluate directly the way such measures are likely to affect their economic well-being. But it is costly to acquire information about distributive consequences, sustainable alternatives, and future prospects. Political cues and loyalties can be important for reducing those costs (Popkin 1994) .
In Mexico, both the president and the ruling party (Partido Revolucionario Institucional, or PRI) have been major focal points of political loyalties throughout most of the twentieth century. Presidents traditionally have towered over the political landscape, exercising extensive powers during their six-year term. As heads of state and of the ruling party, they controlled access to all major bureaucratic and elective offices, dominated the policymaking process, and named their successor. They have also exercised significant influence over public opinion, both through the quasimonopolistic and proregime television networks and through private newspapers that depend on the government for advertising and newsprint. In response to Attitudcs toward Economic Rcform in Mcxico the 1982 debt crisis, presidcnts De la Madrid, Salinas, and Zcdillo deployed their powcrs to push through wide-ranging stabilization and adjustment initiativcs, and Salinas in particular used his extensive influcncc over the mass media to cultivatc public support (Bcltrin and Moreno 1996; Ccntcno 1994) .
The PRI has been a much more reluctant partncr in this process. Its main support historically has come from social scctors with a maior stakc in government u patronage and protcction, and important factions have rcsistcd change in thc policy status quo. Nevertheless, until at least thc mid-1990s. the PRI remained a ~ivotal instrumcnt through which reform-oriented presidents controlled opposition and gained clcctoral legitimation. Although the party's clcctoral hcgcmony declined markedly during thc 1980s and thc 1990s, a largc pcrccntage of voters continued to support PRI candidates. Their support arguably stcmmed from a mixture of motives-habit, clientclistic ties, or perhaps aversion to the risks of political changc. ~cvcrthcless, many PRI loyalists may be cxpcctcd to acccpt rcform simply becausc it is associated with the ruling party.
A number of survcys in Mcxico provide useful insights into the bascs of support for the president and ruling party. Thcsc studies found that one factor is generalized judgments about the stability of the dominant-party regimc and the viability of the political alternatives, rather than specific policy preferences or ideological orientations (scc Davis and Coleman 1994, 358; McCann 1995, 1996) . Davis and Langley (1995) suggest that as Mcxico grows more compctitivc clcctorally, party identification may bccomc increasingly important in evaluations of prcsidential pcrformance. Thcsc findings arc gcnerally consistent with our arguments regarding political mediations.
Wc arc conccrncd, however, with cxplaining issue prcfcrcnccs rathcr than political choice. We want to understand the sources of individual attitudcs toward market reform, in particular, how they arc formed, and how thcy rclatc to other characteristics and beliefs of individuals. In raising these cluestions, we addrcss assumptions common in influential works on thc politics of cconomic rcform (e.g., Fricden 1991; Haggard and Webb 1994; Przeworski 1991) . Thcsc attach considerablc importancc to socioeconomic background, distributive Gtcrcsts, and judgments about economic conditions, but thcy generally pay less attention to the role of political mediations.
Orientations toward the president and the PRI, of coursc, can be expcctcd to affect policy preferences in combination with thcsc other influcnccs. As we shall discuss below, thc interaction among such factors is likely to be quitc complex. Tllc underlying principle of our analysis, however, is rclativcly simplc: The direction of causality goes from sociodemographic background, to judgments about thc economy and political loyalties, to preferences about reform.
The artick is organized into six sections. The first provides a description of tllc data' discusses the measurement of opinions about reformthe dependent variable. The third shows the bivariate Junc 1998 associations with variables related to social background, economic judgments, and political loyalties. The fourth and fifth provide a multivariate analysis and a more complcx causal model of opinion formation based on thcsc findings. Finally, thcrc is a brief conclusion.
THE SURVEYS
The three national surveys on which this study is based were organizcd by the Mexican Office of the Presidency. Questionnaires were dcsigncd within t l~c office; the survey was conducted by Opinion Profcsional S.A. dc C.V., a private company specializing in policy polling and focus groups. Field workers wcrc not informed of thc client's identity; thcy identified thcmsclvcs to respondents only as employees of Opinion Profcsional. Because it was cxpected that many respondents would be reluctant to express their voting intentions and political preferences, a simulated secret ballot procedure was employed for these questions. Rcspondents were askcd to mark their preference on a shcct of paper, seal it, and place it in a box.
The surveys in September 1992 and Novcmber 1994 containcd 4,960 and 4,998 houschold interviews, rcspcctively; in March 1995, there were 2,816 household interview^.^ Households werc locatcd for intcrvicws through a multistage, stratified probability sampling procedure. At each household, an intcrvicw of about 45-60 minutes was conducted with one respondent, sclcctcd at random, with about an equal proportion of mcn and womcn. Thc response rate is estimatcd at 75%; interviews werc obtained in three of every four houscholds contacted. For each survcy, t l~c margin of crror attributable to sampling crror was estimated at +/-2%. Further dctails on sampling and qucstions arc providcd in appcndices A and B.
Govcrnmcnt-sponsored surveys can sometimes be criticizcd for loading questions in ways that elicit responses favorable to the political objectives of the president. In thcsc surveys, howcvcr, respondcnts were offcrcd cxplicit "pro and con" choices on most issues, including the pcrformancc of the president, electorril prcfcrcnccs, general support for thc govcr~~ment's cc:onomic program, and opinions on scven of the ten pollicy items used in our analysis (see the appcndices for precise wording of cach item). Exceptions wcrc thc itcms on NAFTA and bank privatization in thc 1992 survcy and the question on the stabilization pact in 1994, which askcd respondcnts only if thcy "appro7~cd." The potcntial affirmative biases contained in such wordings, howcvcr, arc more likely to constitntc a problcm for cstimatcs of aggregatc distributiofns of opinion than for analyses of thc association among variables. The risks, moreover, arc reduced still further by thc use of multiple measurcs of the dcpcndent variablc, which produce similar rcsults. 
MEASURING OPINIONS ABOUT ECONOMIC REFORM
Two different measures of opinions about reform were used, each with some distinct advantages and disadvantages. One was General Support, based on a question that asked respondents to evaluate the "economic measures" taken by the government. Respondents who viewed those measures as "adequate for resolving the economic situation" were regarded as strong supporters of reform; those who thought only "some" measures were adequate were considered moderate supporters; those who answered "inadequate" were labelled opponents. The same general support item was included in all three surveys and is thus especially useful for gauging changes in opinion over time. The other measure was an additive Policy Index, based on responses to questions about more specific :;tabilization and structural adjustment policies that K !ere major components of the government's marketoiiented strategy: NAFTA, privatization, foreign inves3tment, and wage-price agreements (see Appendix A for precise questions and coding process). The policy itenls used for the index differed across the surveys, mak ing the indexes less useful than the general support mea:uure for comparisons over time. Yet, the specific polic y conrent of the indexes provides confidence that responses do not simply reflect more general political predi spositions.
Tal~le 1 shows that opinions about specific policies were consistently associated with support/opposition for the general policy measures taken by the government. This provides a good indication that both sets of measures are valid-that they tap actual opinions about salient issues of economic reform. The 1992 respondents who agreed with the general economic policies of the government also tended to support NAFTA and, to a somewhat lesser extent, the privatization of banks. In 1994, general support was closely Vol. 92, No. 2 associated with foreign investment and the antiinflation program. In 3995, thosc who favored the governmcnt's overall economic management wcrc also inclincd to support the stabilization program announced by President Zedillo, to express faith in pactcd wagcpricc agrccmcnts, and to cxpress confidence that the program would contain i n f l a t i~n .~ Before analyzing thesc prcfcrcnccs at the iridividual lcvel, it is important to consider briefly the broader political and economic context in which the surveys wcrc conducted and how aggregatc opinion toward reform changcd ovcr timc. Thc 1992 survey was conducted during thc third consecutive ycar of recovcry from almost a dccadc of cconomic stagnation and pricc instability (Banco dc Mcxico 1993) , and general support was prcdictably high: 57% wholly approvcd of government policies, 33% approved in part, and only 10% opposed.
During the next two years, the situation was less promising. In 1993 the growth rate flattened, and in 1994, the year of the next national survey, the turbulent process of presidential succession entered into full swing. Strong and moderate supporters fell to 44% and 38%, respectively, while opponents rose to 18%. By the March 1995 survey, the peso crisis had occurred, and the Mexican economy was entering its third month of resurgent inflation, recession, and growing political uncertainty. Almost half the population (47%) expressed disagreement with the reforms, while strong and moderate support dropped to 31% and 22%, respectively.
This sharp decline in support is consistent with Jorge Buendia's (1996) finding that evaluations of reform in Mexico are based on retrospective judgments about economic performance rather than on expectations of improvement. Surveys conducted in Peru (Stokes 1996) and Poland (Przeworski 1991 (Przeworski , 1996 indicate that people in those countries are willing to accept "temporary" hardships during the early phases of reform in the expectation of long-term benefits. After so many years of adjustment in Mexico, it is not surprising that people have begun to respond to economic fluctuations in a manner more typical of "normal" market economies.
A somewhat different puzzle is posed by the fact that, despite deteriorating economic conditions and growing public dissatisfaction, a large sector of the population (53%) continues to express complete or partial agreement with government policies. This raises the question of how opinion is distributed among different population sectors. Are some groups more likely than others to support or oppose reform, and An additional check on the coherence of the policy index was provided by a principal-component factor analyses of the individual items. In each ycar, this yielded only a singlc factor with an eigenvalue greater than 1.0. Factor loadings for all but one of the individual itcms ranged from more than 0.6 to more than 0.8. The lowest loading was 58, for approval of the wage-price pact in 1094. Principal-component analyses which included both general support and policy itcms produced similar results. For each ycar, the analysis produced a singlc factor, with individual loadings ranging from . 65 to .78 in 1902, .58 to .75 in 1904, and .54 to .82 
SUPPORT FOR REFORM: BlVARlATE RELATIONSHIPS
We begin by examining the bivariate associations between attitudes toward reform and the three sets of independent variables mentioned in the introduction: sociodemographic background, judgments about current and future economic performance, and political attachments to leaders and parties. From what we know generally about the effects of economic reform across socioeconomic groups and geographic regions (Lustig 1994; Morely 1994) , we can hypothesize that several demographic variables may reflect respondents' "objective" interests with respect to reform. Public sector employees may be more inclined to opposition than those in the private sector, since the former are more threatened by privatization and the downsizing of the state. Support for reform may also be relatively low among residents of greater Mexico City. The urbanized and relatively cosmopolitan capital and its surrounding territories have long been an important center of opposition to the ruling PRI and the established authority of the regime (BeltrBn and Moreno 1996) . In addition, this region contains a high concentration of import-substituting firms and government workers.
The possible influence of income, education, and gender is much more ambiguous, but we can suggest a number of ways in which they may affect opinion about reform. Wealthier groups would be in the best position to tolerate the risks associated with large-scale transformation.4 Education would increase access to information about actual and potential policy effects. In Eastern Europe, there is some evidence that people with more schooling expect to benefit from reforms and therefore are more inclined to support them (Evans 1995) . ' 1n Mexico, however, prolonged efforts at economic adjustment have yielded mediocre or poor results, so people with more education may be skeptical about the government claims. Finally, reforms have opened up new employment opportunities for women, especially in the maquiladora (exportprocessing) sector of the economy. Despite their low wages and poor working conditions, they may be more inclined than men to favor reforms.
The surveys also asked for judgments about economic conditions. Respondents were asked to evaluate both their personal economic situation and that of the country-indicators of "pocketbook" and more "collective" concerns. Another set of questions measured intertemporal judgments-whether they expected their personal situation to improve in the future.5 The 1995
It is also possible, however, that the very poor would be less inclined to oppose reform than the lower middle class, which historically has been highly dependent on public employment and services (Nelson 1992) .
In 1994 and 1995, this question did not make explicit reference to economic well-being, but it is reasonably safe to assume that the item measured economic expectations. Evidence from focus groups June 1998 survey included an item on fear of unemployment. We examined these responses, because such fears have been shown to be a very important source of opposition to reform in Eastern Europe (Przeworski 1993 (Przeworski , 1996 and Peru (Stokes 1996) as well as Mexico (Buendia 1996) .
For reasons discussed above, support for reform also can be expected to be associated with favorable orientations toward the president and the PRI. The direction of causality, to be sure, can be questioned; policy preferences can determine as well as reflect political attachments, and it is beyond the scope of this article to model the potential two-way effects. In this instance, however, government policies on stabilization and market-oriented reforms challenged principles of state-led development long supported by virtually all sectors of Mexican society. Thus, it is plausible to assume that Mexican presidents and their allies within the ruling party have led rather than followed public opinion on policy (Aguilar Camin 1989) .
These impressions are supported by findings in other studies of Mexican public opinion. In surveys conducted in 1988 and 1991, McCann (1995, 1996,9) found that in initial decisions to support the PRI or the opposition, views on policy issues were "only marginally related to voter intentions." Davis and Coleman (1994, 358) argue similarly that voters' "overall impression of the performance of the Salinas administration drives their views about performance in more specific policy areas." The widespread popularity enjoyed by President Salinas during his term thus seems far more plausibly attributable to his mastery of public relations, or perhaps to the prestige of the presidency itself, rather than to his privatization and trade policies.
As indicators of orientation toward the president and the PRI, we relied on responses to two items. The first asked whether respondents agreed or disagreed with the way the incumbent president (Salinas or Zedillo) was "handling his job." The second asked respondents to indicate their preferences among the major contenders in the most recent presidential election, each of whom was explicitly identified as : t candidate of the PRI, the Partido Acci6n Nacion, 11 (PAN), or the Partido de la Revoluci6n Democrat? ca (PRD). Unfortunately, more direct questions abr ~u t party identification were not included in any of the three surveys, and we do not claim that the item we use is a fully valid proxy. Nevertheless, the question ir~tro-duces party into the respondent's frame of refercmce, and the answers can be presumed to provide a rezisonable indication of partisan orientation.6
Bivariate relationships are shown in tables 2 and 3. Table 2 reveals how general support for the ecor~omic program is distributed among subgroups of the sample.
showed that economic well-being was the dominant issue in discussions of personal concerns. 6 Preelection polls show strong correlations (between .7 and .8) between responses to the standard question on party identification and the items used in this study. There is a strong association between party identification and presidential vote (Mercado (Gasca 1997, 316 Table 3 shows the strength of the associations between the independent variables and the two measures of attitudes toward reform. Both general support and the policy indexes are strongly and consistently linked to economic perceptions and political orientation, but the associations with the demographic variables are far weaker. Among the demographic variables, region is most strongly associated with preferences about reform. In both tables 2 and 3, residents of Mexico City are generally less likely to express favorable opinions than those in other regions of the country. As already suggested, this may reflect the effect of economic liberalization on the import-substituting economy of central Mexico or relatively more skepticism toward the government.
The relationship between opinions about reform and the other demographic variables is weak or inconsistent. Table 3 , fofexample, shows that respondents with higher incomes and those who worked in the private sector were more likely to express favorable opinions in 1992 and 1994, but in 1995 these associations disappeared or went in the opposite direction. The association with education is positive in some cases and negative in others, and gender differences are insignificant across the three surveys.
One possible explanation for these findings may lie in the weakness of Mexico's civil society; interest associations were generally dependent on the government or ruling party and were not strongly inclined to articulate and contest the distributive implications of reform. It is also possible that sociodemographic background influences preferences indirectly, through effects on economic perceptions and political loyalties. This point is addressed in the causal models presented below.
In contrast to the sociodemographic variables, perceptions of economic well-being are closely linked to support for reform. The only surprise-and it is a very mild one-concerns fear of unemployment. This variable correlates significantly with both general support and the policy index; but a somewhat stronger association could have been expected, given the importance attached to fear of unemployment in the comparative literature. A possible explanation is that the substantial layoffs following Zedillo's stabilization initiative did not begin until after the March 1995 survey, and earlier Mexican reforms were not accompanied by very high rates of unemployment, unlike the situation in either Poland or Peru.
On the whole, however, preferences about reform are strongly associated with evaluations of the economy. People who judge the economy favorably are very likely to back both the overall government program and the specific policies. This holds for both retrospective and prospective judgments, for "sociotropic" and "pocketbook" concerns, and for fear of unemployment.
The multivariate analysis will provide a fuller discussion of the relative importance of these different types of judgment. It should be noted, however, that during the 1995 crisis, people expressing hope for the future made a much larger contribution to overall support for reform than did the tiny minority of Mexicans who judged the current situation favorably. "Optimists" in 1995 constituted 17.6% of the total sample but more than 30% of those who supported the government's economic program.
Finally, there is a strong and consistent association between political orientation and support for reform, a pattern which persists through the 1995 crisis. Despite the severe economic deterioration, a large group of respondents expressed support for the president (47%) and the party (40%). Furthermore, the reform program of the government received approval from about half of these political loyalists (47% in the presidential group and 50.8% in the PRI group), compared to only 31% for the total sample.
Of course, the relatively strong support for the government's program among presidential and PRI backers could stem from their inclination to affirm their political loyalties rather than from their policy preferences. If that were true, then the distributions shown in Table 2 would simply reflect at autological relation between independent and dependent variables. For reasons discussed above, however, the policy indexes are less vulnerable to this criticism, and Table  3 shows a strong association between these indexes and political orientation. In most cases, in fact, it equals or exceeds the strength of association between the policy indexes and judgments about the economy.
SUPPORT FOR REFORM: MULTIVARIATE ANALYSIS
The central question raised by the bivariate associations is the extent to which political orientation plays an independent role in shaping opinion and the extent to which it simply reflects economic well-being. The collapse of the economy clearly undermined support for the president and the PRI candidates in 1995. Does this mean that loyalis$ respondents are backing the reform because of their positive views of the economy, or does political orientation have an effect that is not simply a reflection of economic perceptions?
These questions were examined through regressions of the measures of support against the independent variables discussed in the preceding section. The generic model is as follows: Tables 4 and 5 show the ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of these models.' Taken together, the demographic, perceptual, and political orientation variables explain a substantial percentage of the variation in both the policy index and general support for reform. Adjusted R' in the two sets of regressions ranges between .34 and -27 for general support and between .21 and .26 for the policy index.
The weights of the individual variables within each equation-as indicated by the standardized betas-are also quite consistent across the surveys and correspond closely with what we found in the bivariate statistics. Both models are thus robust across time. Although residence in Mexico City had some effect on general support in 1992 and 1994, the demographic variables are generally among the weakest predictors of reform preferences. Gender crosses significance thresholds in the estimates of the 1994 and 1995 political index, but its contribution is limited, and contrary to our hypotheses, women are somewhat less likely than men to have favorable opinions about reform. As in the bivariate statistics, the strongest contributions come from judgments about economic conditions and political orientation.
Looking more closely at the way perceptions of well-being affect support for reform, two points can be noted. First, as in the United States, views of general economic conditions are consistently stronger predictors of support for reform than are perceptions of personal well-being. Standardized betas for the former are significant and relatively high in all six regressions, whereas personal well-being is significant only for the 1994 estimate of the policy index.
The second point of interest is the strength and consistency of expectations as a predictor of support for reform. In 1992 and 1994, this variable made substantial contributions to both general support and the policy index. During the crisis year 1995, as judgments about the economy turned uniformly negative, the standardized betas for expectations were surpassed only by the variables measuring political orientation. The importance of expectations indicates the need to modify somewhat the conclusions drawn at the aggregate level about retrospective judgments (Buendia 1996) . These did contribute to a broad decline in backing for reform, but respondents continued to differ in their judgments about future prospects. As just noted, this helped to account for the persistence of support for government policy during 1995.
Finally, the multivariate models show quite strong support for our hypothesis about political mediations.
In the case of SUPPORT, an ordinal measure, we used ordered probit regressions as well as OLS statistics. The ordered probit estimates are more suitable for the analysis of ordinal data. The results are very consistent with those obtained through OLS regressions. We present the OLS findings in order to facilitate comparisons with the policy index. Even after controlling for perceptions of economic
CAUSAL MODELS
well-being and sociodemographic variables, positive
The estimates in our multivariate analyses show the assessments of the president and of PRI electoral extent to which political orientation, economic percepcandidates were consis,tently among the strongest pretions, and demographic variables affect support for dictors of support for reform. In both 1992 and 1994, a reform but not how they combine to do so. In this respondent's orientation toward the president was the section, we model possible paths through which these best single predictor of general support and prefervariables influence opinion, building on the results ences on the policy index, and partisan preferences also shown above. The hypothesized causal relations and made a substantial contribution relative to other varithe path coefficients for 1994 are displayed in Figure 1 . ables in the model.
To simplify the presentation, we do not show the Political orientation continued to make the strongest coefficients for 1992 and 1995, but these parallel closely contribution in the 1995 regressions. Unlike 1992 and the findings for 1994, and we indicate in the text the 1994, however, the preference for PRI candidates points at which they diverge.8 tended to be a somewhat stronger predictor than was
The sociodemographic variables in the model are approval of the president. In all the estimates, moreregion and income, both of which had at least a modest over, there was an increase over time in the b coeffieffect on support in our earlier analysis. Numerous cients of the partisanship variable.-This pattern may studies have suggested that opposition to the regime is reflect in part the contrast between the flamboyant strongest in metropolitan areas (Mercado Gasca and Salinas and the more tentative style of Zedillo. Or, as Zuckermann 1994), and on the basis of this literature, Davis and Langley (1995) suggest, it may reflect the we posit that region influences preferences about regrowing importance of partisan cues for making ecoform through its effects on political orientation. Innomic judgments, as Mexican party politics becomes more competitive. In either event, despite deep internal divisions among PRI activists, the party remained To illustrate our broader findings, path coefficients from 1994 were selected because that year was closest to "normal" in terms of the an important mechanism for building public consent economic recovery and support for the president. In contrast, 1992 (or at least acquiescence) to reform policies. come, we suggest, affects policy preferences through a different path: Wealthier individuals may be expected to have more positive views of the economy and more positive expectations about the future, which in turn would encourage positive views of reform. Specification of the sociodemographic antecedents of policy preferences are of less concern in this paper than are economic perceptions and political orientation. Nevertheless, the two factors that we highlight are not implausible points of departure for the analysis. Income and region consistently and significantly affect economic judgments, political orientation, and expectations in the directions hypothesized. The direct effects of both income and Mexico City on attitudes toward reform in 1994 are stronger than we expected, but they are still weak relative to the other factors presumed to have the most direct influence, and they disappear entirely in the specifications of the model for 1992 and 1995.
The most proximate influences on policy preferences come from three sets of variables: judgments about the economy, orientation toward the president and the PRI candidates, and expectations about future improvement. Yet, these perceptions affect one another, and support for reform, in several different ways.
Judgments about economic performance can have both a direct and an indirect (or mediated) effect on popular assessment of economic reforms. Given Mexico's long experience with adjustment, people can be expected to judge reforms in terms of how they think the economy is doing, regardless of their political orientation. Yet, judgments about economic performance also have an important effect on support for the president and the ruling party. People who feel positively about them are more likely to have faith in their policies, even if they are not sure how such policies have affected economic outcomes.
Our models allow us to disaggregate the total nonspurious effects of economic judgment on policy preferences and to compare the relative contributions made by the direct path and by paths passing through support for the president and the PRI. As expected, the direct path from economic judgment does indeed make a strong contribution to the policy index and general support-about 50% of the total nonspurious effects in 1994. But the paths leading through support for the president and the PRI also make important contributions to the nonspurious effects of economic judgments-about 33% of the effect on the policy index and about 36% on general support. In the other two years as well, about one-third of the effects of economic judgments on policy preferences passed through political orientation.
Expectations play a somewhat different role in our model. We suggest that they will affect policy preferences relatively directly but will be shaped by a number Adjusted R' N F of different influences.'One path to expectations goes through judgment about economic performance; people who think things are going well are more likely to feel their own situation will improve over time. Expectations also may be shaped by political orientation. People who support the president or party in power are also inclined to trust them to bring a brighter future. These positive expectations, in turn, would lead to support for policy reforms. The path coefficients in Figure 1 show that judgment about the economy has the strongest single influence on expectations (.22) but is outweighed by the combined effect of support for the president (.12) and the PRI (.16). Expectations, finally, are consistently and fairly strongly related to support for reform in all years and all specifications of the model. Finally, our model posits a number of different mechanisms through which positive views about the president and the ruling party can lead to support for reform. One, just discussed, is through shaping expectations about improvement in economic well-being. Other and more direct paths may reflect the way respondents evaluate the competence of the incum- bents relative to opponents. People who support the economic policies of the regime do so because they believe it can produce better results than its challengers. Our path analysis shows that the direct effect of presidential support outweighs both judgments about the economy and expectations, a finding that is generally true for 1992 and 1995 as well.' The effect of political orientation on policy preferences, it may be noted, is strongest relative to perceptions about the economy in 1995; in that year, the path coefficient leading from support for the president to the policy index reached .36, the highest in any of the estimates. At a time of economic crisis, people may support the policies of the regime not because of retrospective judgments or hopes for the future but because they perceive a lack of political alternatives.
The single exception is for the 1992 policy index, in which the coefficient for economic judgment is .21 and that for the president is .19.
CONCLUSION
they are important. Spanish workers were more inIn all countries undergoing economic adjustment, public support is potentially an important factor in sustaining reforms. Survey research on the sources of support is still at a relatively early phase, and there is much to be learned. One conclusion is suggested rather clearly, however, both by existing theory and our own findings: Immediate "pocketbook" concerns are neither the only nor the most important basis on which people evaluate policy. Both socioeconomic interests and "subjective" perceptions of well-being may influence the formation of policy preferences, but this influence depends on how people link their personal situation to broader patterns of economic performance, prospects for the future, and the government in power. In these respects, Popkin's (1994, 31 ) characterization of American voters appears to apply to Mexicans as well: They "are not self-centered and reflexive in evaluating their leaders and making voting choices. Their evaluations and voting decisions depend on whether their reasoning connects their situations to the national situation and to the actions of their leaders." When people give precedence to "national conditions" over "pocketbook concerns," they are not necessarily motivated by altruism; they may believe that reform will have a stronger effect on overall economic performance than on their own personal condition. Individual economic interests, to be sure, may influence the way people view the economy-a point we have suggested in our causal model. As in the United States, however, judgments about the economy as a whole are likely to have the most direct effect on the way people evaluate reform (Fiorina 1981, 90; Kinder, Adams, and Gronke 1989, 511; Lau and Sears 1981) .
Although preferences for reform are influenced by judgments about how it will affect the future, we must qualify our findings about the role of expectations in several ways. Expectations may be less important in Mexico than in countries where adiustment initiatives are more recent. The sharp rise in the percentage of Mexicans opposing reform since the crisis of 1995 indicates increasing disillusionment with promises of the future prosperity; they are understandably inclined to judge reform in terms of the existing economic record. Yet, given the extraordinary hardships most Mexicans have endured since 1995, it is somewhat surprising that support for reform has remained so strong. While this may partially reflect a belief that there are no better alternatives, our data suggest that hopes for improvement continue to play an important part.
The most striking finding to emerge from our analysis concerns the role of political orientation in shaping policy preferences. Its importance is well documented in the American setting; in situations of high uncertainty and limited information, political cues and group loyalties can provide crucial short-cuts in the evaluation of both candidates and policies (Popkin 1994) . In most countries undergoing economic adjustment, the quantitative effect of these mechanisms has not been analyzed, but impressionistic evidence suggests that clined to acEept painf61 market reforms in the 1980s, for example, because they were undertaken by the Socialist Party (Bermeo and Garcia-Duran 1994, 112-6; Haggard and Webb 1994, 16-8) . In countries such as Peru and Argentina, policies pursued under Fujimori and Menem gained broad acceptance in part because they were backed by presidents who appeared to be "in charge" (Haggard and Kaufman 1995, 198-202) . Our data from Mexico show a comparable effect, notwithstanding the long-term erosion of the regime's legitimacy. During his term, Salinas successfully used his authority and control of the PRI to build personal prestige and sell his reform program. People who were positively inclined toward the president and the PRI tended to support reform regardless of their views of the economy.
After Salinas, the "imperial" presidency declined, due to economic crisis and Zedillo's different style of political leadership. In his effort to respond to the crisis, however, Zedillo can still draw on considerable political capital. Acceptance of his program is still substantial, and a large segment of the population continues to approve of the president and to support the PRI.
In few societies are political loyalties unconditional; they are continuously subject to reevaluation as circumstances change and new information becomes available. Our path analysis indicates that while approval of the president and the ruling party provides a guide for determining policy preferences in Mexico, it is strongly influenced by evaluations of economic wellbeing. The president is, in effect, a salesman who must persuade the public that he can bring a brighter future, and his success depends to a significant extent on what has been delivered in the past.
During the mid-1990s, the evident failure to deliver on promises has had two important implications for the capacity of the president and the PRI to mediate preferences about reform. First and most directly, support for the regime has weakened, and belief in the capacity of its leadership to resolve the problems facing Mexican society has diminished. Put somewhat differently, the "new information" coming from the collapse of the economy is undermining the political predispositions that underlay beliefs about reform (Zaller 1992) .
Second, the crisis has accelerated the trend toward a more competitive electoral system, which fundamentally alters the political context in which Mexican public opinion is formed. On the center-left, the PRD has appealed to voters dissatisfied with the government's market-oriented reforms. On the right, although PAN leaders tend to share the policy views of the president, support for reform is lower among their followers than among the backers of the PRI (refer to Table 2 ).
Over time, increasing multiparty competition in Mexico is likely to expose that society to a wider debate about alternative solutions to current economic dilemmas, and opposition parties will have a stronger role in shaping perceptions (Davis and Langley 1995) . It remains to be seen whether the result will be an unsus-tainable backlash against the reforms or more constructive forms of political learning. Either way, Mexicans are likely to be presented with new ways to interpret the experiences derived from the economic crisis, and as never before, they will have opportunities to act on their opinions within the electoral arena. In the past, the government, workers, peasants, and businessmen signed agreements to limit the rise of prices. Do you agree that those pacts were useful or useless? (1) Yes, they were useful (2) No, they were not useful
Agreement with Stabilization Program [1995:Q24j
En general, iesta usted de acuerdo o en desacuerdo con las medidas anunciadas por el gobierno para enfrentar la crisis economica? (1) Acuerdo (2) Desacuerdo
In general, do you agree or disagree with the measures announced by the government to confront the economic crisis? (1) Agree (2) *"Lown scores are all those which fall in the bottom third of the index in a given year. "Medium" scores are those in the middle third. "High" scores are those in the upper third.
-
Missing Data and Biases in the Policy Indexes
The high percentage of missing data in the policy indexes is attributable in part to the fact that the indexes are composites which eliminate any respondent who answers "don't know" on any of the individual policy items. A comparison of valid responses and "don't knows" for the Vol. 92, No. 2 indexes showed that persons with limited education and low incomes were underrepresented in the valid responses. In 1994, for example, respondents with no more than an elementary school education comprised 37% of the total sample, 30.2% of the valid responses, and 59.0% of the nonresponses. People classified as "poor" constituted 53.4% of the sample, 48.9% of the valid responses, and 67.0% of the nonresponses. Women and private-sector workers were also underrepresented, but to a lesser extent. Biases were also either more limited or non-existent on questions concerning judgments about the economy and in our measures of political orientation. People making negative judgments about the economy or expressing opposition to the PRI or president were slightly less inclined to answer, but the differences between valid responses and nonresponses were generally between 1 and 3 percentage points.
To assess the impact of these biases, we regressed the individual policy items used to construct the indexes against the independent variables in the general model. With much lower percentages of missing data, the results of these regressions paralleled those for the policy indexes: limited impact for the demographic variables, a larger impact for economic judgments, and political orientations with the greatest effect. It should be emphasized as well that estimates in the policy index models were very similar to those for general support, which had much lower percentages of missing data.
APPENDIX B: INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

Sociodemographic
Sector: [1 992, 1994 [1 992, , 1995 iEn cual tip0 de institucion, organismo o empresa trabaja usted? (1) Gobierno federal, estatal o municipal (2) Empresa paraestatal u organismo descentralizado (3) Empresa privada (4) Negocio propio (5) Regions were in turn divided into urban, semi-urban, and rural zones, weighted according to the proportion of such zones in the region, and were divided again into neighborhoods weighted in terms of socioeconomic conditions. Blocks within neighborhoods were chosen for sampling with an equal probability of selection, and households visited were selected with systematic sampling and a random start. Urban strata were those with more than 15,000 inhabitants: semi-urban contained between 2,500 and 15,000; rural were less than 2,500. The coverage of rural and semi-rural areas distinguishes these national surveys from many partial ones that sample only urban populations.
[ Income: 11992, 1994 11992, , 1995 iCual es su rango de ingreso familiar? (1) 0 a 1 Salarios Minimos (SM) (2) 1 a 3 SM (3) 3 a 5 SM (4) 5 a 7 SM (5) 7 a 10 SM (6) 10 o mis SM What is the range of your family income? (1) 0 to 1 Minimum Salaries (MS) (2) 1to 3 MS (3) 3 to 5 MS (4) 5 to 7 MS (5) 7 to 10 MS (6) Personal Expectations for the Next Year [1992:Q16; 1994: QlO; 1995:Q6] iC6mo Cree usted que sera su situaci6n personal el aiio que entra? (1) Mejor (2) 
Party: Electoral Preference for Presidential Election
De 10s candidatos a la presidencia en las pasadas elecciones de 1988, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas del PRD, Manuel J. Si hoy se repitieran las elecciones para Presidente de la Rep6blica y 10s 6nicos candidatos fueran el candidato del PRI, Ernesto Zedillo, el candidato del PRD, CuauhtCmoc Cardenas y el candidato del PAN, Diego Fernandez de Cevallos, por cual candidato votaria usted?
(1) Zedillo-PRI (2) Cardenas-PRD (3) Fernandez de Cevallos-PAN If the election for president were repeated today, and the only candidates were the candidate of the PRI, Ernesto Zedillo, the candidate of the PRD, Cuauhtemoc Cardenas, and the candidate of the PAN, Diego Fernandez de Cevallos, which candidate would you vote for?
(1) Zedillo-PRI (2) 
